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HELPLESS GIANTS: THE NATIONAL PARKS 
AND THE REGULATION OF 
PRIVATE LANDS 
Joseph L. Sax* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The national parks are among the few unambiguous triumphs of 
American public policy. Carved out of a vast public domain that 
was being cruelly exploited and recklessly given away, the parks 
stand as a rare monument of national concern for posterity. Yet the 
decision to establish the parks as distinctive public lands has itself 
produced difficulties, for, although the parks alone were set aside to 
be conserved "unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,"1 
the parks do not stand alone. Ori their borders, and sometimes in 
their midst, are private landholdings, which are subject to no such 
protective mandate. 
While activities on neighboring lands have always created some 
problems for park managers, as even the earliest reports from 
Yellowstone reveal, 2 the adverse impact of these activities on the 
parks has become a major issue only in recent years. The early parks 
were enclaves within a huge and largely unused public domain; 
they were protected by their own isolation. Often they were sur-
rounded by national forest land that had itself been set aside 
for protection by the Forest Service in its halcyon days. Today, 
however, most new units of the parks system3 are created in close 
proximity to major population centers. They are frequently the last 
fragments of unspoiled scenery that remain easily accessible to 
millions of urban residents. 4 Even in the West, intensive develop-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1957, Harvard; J.D. 1959, 
University of Chicago.-Ed. 
1. Act of Aug. 25, 1916, 39 Stat. 535, ch. 408, § 1 (1916) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-460 (1970), as amended by Supp. V 1975). 
2. See H. HAMPTON, How THE U.S. CAVALRY SAVED OUR NATIONAL PARKS 92 
(1971). See also J. IsE, OuR NATIONAL PARK POLICY 483 (1961); H. JAMES, Ro-
MANCE OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 48 (1939). 
3. Since the parks range from wilderness to rather intense urban uses, manage-
ment goals differ significantly within the system. See U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 
National Park Service, Management Policies, Introduction (1975) (mimeo) [herein-
after Management Policies Report]. This article will treat the entire system as a 
unity since the legal problems of regulating private lands are identical. 
4. E.g., eastern national seashores such as Cape Cod [Act of Aug. 7, 1961, Pub. 
239 
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ment and private ownership sometimes exist at the very edges of 
the parks.5 Moreover, a number of park units, particularly at some 
of the newer National Seashores, contain substantial private 
landholdings within the park boundaries. 0 
This new set of circumstances has spawned a variety of problems. 
At Redwoods National Park in California, private timber companies 
own land on the watershed of Redwood Creek, immediately adjacent 
to the park; their lumbering activities have caused erosion, stream 
siltation, and blow-down of park timber, in addition to the unsightly 
visual effects of large-scale clearcutting. 7 Several years ago, a 
private entrepreneur's plan to build a large tower on private land 
immediately overlooking the battlefield site at Gettysburg National 
Military Park led first to a bitter controversy and ultimately to liti-
gation initiated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 8 More 
recently, Park Service officials have expressed concern over a pro-
posal by Marriott Corporation to build a so-called theme park next 
to Manassas National Battlefield Park.0 At Fire Island National Sea-
shore, where there are substantial private landholdings, intensive 
homesite development has proceeded with the approval of local 
zoning authorities;10 bitter litigation has followed restrictions on ve-
L. No. 87-126, 75 Stat. 284 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 459b (1970) )]; Fire Island 
[Act of Sept. 11, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-587, 78 Stat. 928 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 459e ( 1970) )]; Assateague Island [Act of Sept. 21, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-165, 
79 Stat. 824 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 459f (1970) )]. Some units are in the midst 
of major urban centers. E.g., Cuyahoga Valley National Recreation Area [Act of 
Dec. 27, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-555, 88 Stat. 1784 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460ff 
(Supp. V 1975) )]; Gateway National Recreation Area [Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-592, 86 Stat. 1308 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460cc (Supp. V 1975) )]; 
Golden Gate National Recreation Area [Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-589, 
86 Stat. 1299 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460bb (Supp. V 1975) )]. 
5. E.g., Redwoods National Park [Act of Oct. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-545, 82 
Stat. 931 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 79c(3)(e) (1970))]. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 
400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
6. See note 4 supra; notes 10, 126, 139, 141 infra. 
7. See authorities cited note 5 supra. 
8. Pennsylvania v. Morton, 381 F. Supp. 293 (D.D.C. 1974); Commonwealth 
v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). 
9. General and Oversight Briefing Relating to Developments Near Manassas Na-
tional Battlefield, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Recreation 
of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93, 
pt. 9, at 47 (1973). Proposals have been made to locate theme parks on the edges 
of other parks as well, such as Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Tennessee. 
Interview with Boyd Evison, Superintendent, Great Smoky Mountains National Park, 
in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Nov. 16, 1976). 
10. Hearings on S. 867 and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on National Parks 
and Recreation of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., ser. 94, pt. 11, at 17 (1975). 
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hicle use by private landowners.11 Owners of undeveloped lands near 
Cape Hatteras National Seashore have demanded utility rights-of-way 
across federal lands, in order to promote the proliferation of summer 
homes. 12 A major airport was planned on the drainage above Ever-
glades National Park.13 A nuclear power plant has been proposed 
for a site immediately adjacent to the Indiana Dunes National Lake-
shore.14 The list could easily be extended. 
While intrusive private activities have increased all around them, 
park managers have stood by nervously, sensing that they were 
caring for helpless giants. The Park Service is aware that Congress 
has given it very little explicit authority to regulate private lands, 15 
but underlying Park Service hesitancy to act is a more profound con-
cern about the constitutional power of the federal government to 
control private land uses near and within the parks. These consti-
tutional doubts, though largely misconceived, arise out of a complex 
set of issues that need to be clarified. This article first de-
scribes current administrative practice and existing legislation per-
taining to the regulation of private lands. Next, it reviews the events 
that have convinced the Park Service that its regulatory authority is 
severely restricted. There follows an examination of the consti-
tutional questions that increased federal control of private lands 
would raise. The article concludes by suggesting a method for 
dealing with the various intrusive private uses that now plague the 
Park Service. 
IL CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGULATION OF PRIVATE LANDS 
There has been very little regulation of private landowners within 
the parks or on their peripheries. Only a handful of statutes direct 
11. See authorities cited note 139 infra. 
12. 49 NATL. PARKS & CONSERVATION 26 (Nov. 1975); 50 id. 4 (May 1976). 
13. L. CARTER, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE, LAND AND WATER POLICY IN A 
GROWTH STATE 187-227 (1974). 
14. Izaak Walton League--0f America v. AEC, 515 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.), revd. 
and remanded, 423 U.S. 12 (1975); on remand, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3341 (1976). 
This article does not consider relations between the Park Service and other federal 
agencies. See, however, The National Forest Ski Area Bill, S. 2125, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1975), as amended, S. 2125, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(a)(3)(D) (1976), 
requiring that the regulated activity have no adverse impact on nearby national parks. 
See also note 30 infra. 
15. Federal regulation of private activity on federally owned lands within the 
parks is well recognized. See United States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 
1972), and cases cited therein. See notes 65, 86 infra. 
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the Secretary of the Interior to control private users within the parks; 
none of these anticipate or provide for the general exercise of land 
use controls. For example, the Secretary is instructed to regulate 
holders of grazing permits at Kings Canyon National Park, 16 to de-
vise rules controlling fishing by long-standing residents at Cape 
Hatteras, 17 and to establish a scheme of regulation for hotel and 
restaurant keepers at Crater Lake.18 Obviously, the regulation pre-
scribed by such statutes is both sporadic and limited. 
In the one instance where Congress has anticipated the need for 
broad federal land use controls, it has sought to achieve these con-
trols indirectly. A series of statutes, principally involving national 
seashore areas, contain so-called sword-of-Damocles provisions.10 
Briefly stated, these laws suspend the Secretary's authority to acquire 
private inholdings by eminent domain if the local governments im-
pose zoning requirements consistent with standards promulgated by 
the Secretary, and if the landowners comply with them. The pro-
visions do not make the federal standards binding on the landowners, 
or directly enforceable by the Park Service; they have instead been 
judicially interpreted to give the Secretary the right to condemn as 
the sole penalty for noncompliance. 20 While the idea is an imagi-
native one, it has often been ineffective because of a chronic short-
age of condemnation funds.21 Moreover, because the landowners 
usually obtain a zoning variance from the local government before 
commencing uses inconsistent with federal standards, they are not 
16. 16 u.s.c. § 80 (1970). 
17. 16 U.S.C. § 459a-1 (1970). 
18. 16 U.S.C. § 123 (1970). Concessions in the parks are subject to "carefully 
controlled safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use." 16 U,S.C. § 20 
(1970). Regulations as to particular parks are collected at 36 C.F.R. §§ 20-31 
(19'76). 
19. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 459b-3(b)(2) (1970) (Cape Cod); 16 U.S.C. 459e-
1(e) (1970) (Fire Island). See also 16 U.S.C. § 410j (1970) (Everglades National 
Park); Eastern Wilderness Act, Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-622, § 6(b), 
88 Stat. 2100-01. These provisions are an extension of an arrangement whereby 
existing residents are allowed to retain lifetime occupancy rights so long as their 
uses are consistent with the Secretary's restrictions. See 16 U.S.C. § 459f-1 (d) 
(1970) (Assateague Island); 16 U.S.C. §§ 459g-l(c), (d) (1970) (Cape Lookout); 
C. CAMPBELL, BIRTH OF A NATIONAL PARK IN THE GREAT SMOKY MOUNTAINS 70, 
99 (1960). 
The sword-of-Damocles Jaws have been upheld in Halpert v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 
574 (S.D. Fla. 1964), affd., 379 U.S. 645 (1965). 
20. See Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1143-44, 1148 (2d Cir. 1974). 
21. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, GENERAL MAN• 
AGEMENT PLAN, FIRE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE 105 (Draft, June, 1976). For the 
procedure for obtaining condemnation approval, see H.R. Rep. No. 1395, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 16 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1275, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1968); S. Rep. 
No. 91-420, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969); S. Rep. No. 91-985, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 11 (1970). 
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even subject to local enforcement on the ground of violation of the 
zoning ordinance. 22 
The Park Service, understandably, has been no more zealous than 
the Congress. Its recently revised Statement of Management poli-
cies reflects its assumption that Congress does not want it to exercise 
regulatory authority over private inholdings. 23 The only discussion 
of inholdings appears in a chapter entitled "Land Acquisition," 
which states that the mission of the Service to protect the parks "in 
the long range . . . is best achieved when exploitative and private 
uses are eliminated by acquisition of the property by the Federal 
Government."24 The management policy is limited to the following 
four points: (1) The Park Service welcomes offers to sell private 
inholdings to the United States; (2) It will not attempt to acquire 
private lands through condemnation so long as they are devoted to 
acceptable uses; (3) . If there are uses incompatible with park 
management, the Service will attempt to negotiate with the owner 
for acquisition; and (4) "In the event all reasonable efforts at ne-
gotiation fail, and the owner persists in his efforts to devote the 
property to a use deemed by the Service to be adverse to the primary 
purpose for which the area was established, the United States may 
institute eminent domain proceedings to acquire the property."25 
The Park Service's published regulations, which are somewhat 
more far-reaching, contain several provisions that could be used to 
suppress the most troublesome private uses. They prohibit inhold-
ers from building structures in any park area or engaging in any 
business unless authorized by a valid permit, contract, or written 
agreement with the United States. 26 Another regulation provides 
that "the creation or maintenance of a nuisance upon . . . any 
private lands within a park area under the exclusive legislative juris-
22. In response to the situation at Fire Island, where the problem of variances 
has been particularly severe, Senator Javits introduced legislation for direct enforce-
ment (including denial of inconsistent variances) of local zoning laws by the Park 
Service. However, this provision was stricken from the bill ultimately passed by both 
Houses of Congress. See S. 867, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
The Senate Committee deleted the enforcement provision because "The Park Serv-
ice has not completed its review for the final master plan for the seashore and the 
Committee recommends that no action be taken on . . . injunctive authority until 
the plan is complete." S. Rep. No. 94-735, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
23. Management Policies Report, supra note 3, at IX-1. In light of the federal 
statutes noted above, see notes 19, 22 supra, that is hardly an unreasonable assump-
tion. See also 16 U.S.C. § 460l-9(a)(l) (1970). 
24. Management Policies Report, supra note 3, at IX-1. 
25. Id. at IX-2, IX-3. 
26. 36 C.F.R. §§ 5.3, 5.7 (1976). 
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diction of the United States is prohibited."27 Despite the potential 
utility of these regulations, neither has been vigorously enforced with 
a view to obtaining broad use controls on private lands within the 
parks.28 
Regulation of lands beyond park boundaries has been even more 
restrained. Only once did Congress give the Park Service explicit 
authority to regulate outside lands; this was a short-lived effort to 
control activity on Indian Reservation lands near Mesa Verde 
National Park, authorization for which was repealed in 1913.20 More 
recently, Senator Goldwater proposed legislation to permit Park 
Service control over national forest lands beyond the boundaries of 
Grand Canyon National Park, but, after substantial opposition arose, 
the provision was removed. 30 
A few other legislative provisions reveal congressional recognition 
of the adverse impact on the parks of activities on nearby private 
lands, but they uniformly abjure the use of noncompensatory govern-
mental regulation. Congress frequently authorizes and encourages 
park officials to negotiate with municipal officials for the enactment 
of local regulations that will protect park lands. 31 And, in a number 
of cases, Congress has expressly given the Secretary special authority 
to acquire additional lands in recognition of the problems created 
by private activity on the peripheries of the parks.32 
Perhaps the best-known provision of this type, and certainly the 
most litigated, 33 arose out of authority given the Park Service in 
27. 36 C.F.R. § 5.13 (1976). 
28. For an example of regulatory activity, see United States v. Carter, 339 F. 
Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 1972). The Park Service seems to be most rigorous in regulat-
ing vehicle use. See text at note 139 infra. 
29. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3607, § 2, 34 Stat. 61'7, repealed, Act of June 
30, 1913, ch. 4, § 1, 38 Stat. 84. Cf. Act of Jan. 31, 1931, ch. 79, 46 Stat. 1053 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 8a-8e (1970)) (park access roads). 
A novel approach is taken in Senator Kennedy's Nantucket Sound Islands Trust 
bill, S. 67, H.R. 10307, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which is designed to provide 
a framework for protection of park lands by control of development, without requir-
ing federal acquisition. 
30. S. 1296, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1973). See Grand Canyon National Park, 
Hearings 011 S. 1296 Before the Subcomm. 011 Parks and Recreation of the Senate 
Comm. 011 Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1973); S. Rep. No. 
93-406, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. Con. Rep. No. 93-1611, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1974); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1374, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The enacted 
law is the Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-620, 88 Stat. 2091 (codified at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 227-28 (Supp. V 1975) ). 
31. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460ff-3(f) (Supp. V 1975). 
32. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 43000 (Supp. V 1975) (Antietem National Battle-
field); 16 U.S.C. § 429b (1970) (Manassas National Battlefield). Cf. Act of Oct. 
15, 1974, Pub. L No. 93-444, 88 Stat. 1304, S. Rep. No. 93-1041, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1974) (protecting the view from Mount Vernon). 
33. See note 5 supra, 
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connection with private lands held by timber companies on the 
borders of the Redwoods National Park. For all its notoriety, 
however, the statutory language is not very daring. It simply states: 
In order to afford as full protection as is reasonably possible to the 
timber, soil, and streams within the boundaries of the park, the 
Secretary is authorized . . . to acquire interests in land from, and 
to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements with, the owners 
of land on the periphery of the park and on watersheds tributary 
to streams within the park designed to assure that the consequences 
of . . . land use . . . will not adversely affect the timber, soil, and 
streams within the park .... 34 
This provision became the subject of notable litigation not because 
it gave the Secretary unusual authority over land beyond park 
boundaries, but because the Sierra Club succeeded in persuading a 
court that the statute permitted private citizens to sue the Secretary 
to force him to implement the provision quoted above. 35 
Whether the extremely restrained posture that has thus far charac-
terized the Congress and the Park Service is necessary or appropriate 
is a question to which we shall soon turn. First, though, it will be 
useful to examine the legal advice that has shaped the passive role 
of the Park Service. 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PARK SERVICE: 
THE VIEW FROM WITHIN 
Traditionally, state cessions of jurisdiction have been considered 
the only basis for federal jurisdiction over private lands. Because 
34. 16 U.S.C. § 79c3 (e) (1970). 
35. See cases cited note 5 supra; Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 570, 572 
(9th Cir. 1971): "A permissive statutory term, like 'as he may deem just and proper' 
. . . is not by itself to be read as a congressional command precluding judicial re-
view. . . . His decisions to regulate or not to regulate in any particular instance, 
as well as the particular mode of regulation chosen-is to be determined by reference 
to these [statutory] objectives." See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), discussed in text at note 116 infra; Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
In Biderman v. Morton, Civil No. 72 C 1060 (E.D.N.Y., Memorandum and Or-
der of Feb. 6, 1973, at 22), the court, in response to a citizen initiated suit seeking 
to require the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate vehicle regulations at Fire Is-
land National Seashore, concluded, 
[fhe issue] seems an odd one to present to a court . . . it appears to be a 
matter within the discretion of the Secretary. . . . [f]he action of the Secre-
tary, it is suggested, is based on his belief of his legal incompetency to act in 
the premises, [but] whether or not such a legal incompetency does exist is a 
matter which is not determined by the Secretary but by the interpretation of the 
law to which he is giving effect. 
Contrast Izaak Walton League v. AEC, 533 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1976): 
"But even assuming the Department of Interior, by exercising its statutory power 
of supervision over the National Lakeshore . . . could obtain injunctive relief against 
threatened irreparable injury to lands within its custody from sources outside, we 
could not justify interruption ... when the Department has not sought such relief." 
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the so-called cession clause is one of the least-known provisions of 
the Constitution, 36 some explanation of it is appropriate, and must 
begin with recognition of the fact that even federal ownership of 
land does not ipso facto create federal legislative authority over that 
land. In the absence of a cession, the states retain the general police 
power over federally owned lands, such-as parks, and, consequently, 
over privately owned lands within and without park boundaries. 37 Of 
course, the United States may govern its own land to the extent nec-
essary to implement its granted powers-for example, the property 
power38 or the war power. 39 To that extent, the federal government 
may displace inconsistent state law by means of the supremacy clause 
of the Constitution. 40 This article will show that these granted pow-
ers also give it authority over privately owned lands. 
Under the cession clause of the Constitution, a state may cede 
general legislative jurisdiction to the federal government.41 The 
states routinely make such cessions for federally owned lands within 
the parks. 42 The courts have held that if a state makes a cession 
for a park without retaining jurisdiction over privately owned land, 
then general legislative jurisdiction for all land, public and private, 
within the boundaries of the park is ceded to the United States. 43 
In such instances, therefore, there is no constitutional problem; 
the federal government is clearly authorized to exercise the full 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. See generally REPORT OF TIIE INTERDEPART-
MENTAL COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE 
STATES, JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, PART II, A TEXT 
OF THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION (1957), 
37. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963). The United States must 
assent to the cession. 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1970). See also United States v. Carmack, 
329 U.S. 230, 240-41 n.10 (1946); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 
537-39 (1885); cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1937); 
Mason v. Tax Commr., 302 U.S. 186 (1937). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, els. 11-14. 
40. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976); Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 403-05 (1917); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 
114 U.S. 525 (1885); United States v. Thompson, 41 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Wash. 1941), 
41. See note 37 supra. The cession clause, despite its limited language, has been 
held to apply to national parks. See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 
U.S. 518 (1938). It also operates as to land purchased or condemned by the United 
States, and to the original public domain. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 
2285 (1976); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). 
42. State laws enacted whenever a unit of the national park system is established 
explicitly make such cessions. See, e.g., authorities cited notes 44, 45 infra. 
43. See United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930); United States v. Peterson, 
91 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aftd., 191 F.2d 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 
U.S. 885 (1951); United States v. Schuster, 220 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1963); OP. 
SoL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, 60 I.D. 169 (1948), 54 I.D. 483 (1934), Op. 
Sol. M-33679 (June 29, 1944). 
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range of police power jurisdiction, including ordinary zoning, over 
all land within the park boundaries. 
If all cessions made by the states included privately owned land, 
no question of constitutional authority would arise as to private 
inholdings, and we would have to consider only the question of 
federal authority for land beyond park boundaries. This is not the 
case, however. State cessions vary considerably in their wording. 
Some clearly do not cede jurisdiction over private inholdings, 44 and 
some are at best ambiguous. 45 Thus, it must be concluded that the 
cession clause cannot, in a general sense, be expected to resolve 
the issue of federal authority even for private lands within park 
boundaries; of course, it does not affect at all the problem of regu-
lating lands external to the parks. 
It is at this point that the question of Park Service authority arises. 
The Service's own perception of whether it n:iay regulate unceded 
private lands within and without the parks is instructive. In 1966, 
it questioned the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior 
concerning the constitutionality of imposing federal zoning on private 
lands within an area that had been authorized as a park, but for which 
no cession of state legislative jurisdiction had yet been made. 46 After 
referring to a 1936 decision of the Supreme Court that set out a 
rather rigorous test of "national concern" as a precondition for the 
valid exercise of federal authority,47 the Solicitor, in a monument of 
understatement, conceded that "a certain amount of liberalization in 
favor of extended Federal power is readily noticeable in subsequent 
court decisions."48 Nonetheless, he concluded that the proposed fed-
eral zoning would be invalid: 
44. See Halpert v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Fla. 1964), affd., 379 U.S. 
645 (1965) (Everglades National Park); Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 288 (1925) 
(Rocky Mountain National Park); MASS, ANN. LAws ch. 777, § 4(1) (1962) (Cape 
Cod National Seashore). 
45. TEX. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5247, § 8 (1974) (Big Bend National Park); 
NEW YoRK UNCONSOL. LAWS § 50-a (McKinney 1975) (Fire Island National Sea-
shore). 
Exclusive jurisdiction is not uniformly ceded to the United States • . . . Of the 
287 areas of the [Park] System, only about 72 have exclusive jurisdiction . • . • 
When the States cede exclusive jurisdiction, such cession normally covers all 
lands within the authorized boundary of the park, including private inhold-
ings • . . • In most instances the State acts ceding jurisdiction provide that the 
cession shall extend to future additions to the park. 
Letter from D. Briggle, Acting Director, National Park Service, to Joseph L Sax, 
L58-LL, Aug. 12, 1976 (on file at Michigan Law Review). 
46. The request is described in Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Parks and 
Recreation, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Assistant to the Director, National 
Park Service, Subject, Federal Zoning, File A-66-2057.18, Nov. 17, 1966, at 1 
[hereinafter cited as Parks & Recreation Memorandum]. 
47. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1936). 
48. Parks & Recreation Memorandum, supra note 46, at 3. 
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Since zoning involves a purely local situation, and since it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to justify the Federal zoning power in con-
nection with any constitutionally granted power, it is our opinion that 
in the absence of a cession by a State and acceptance by the United 
States of legislative jurisdiction over a specific area authorized for 
Federal administration, the zoning statute suggested in your memo-
randum would be held to be unconstitutional. 40 
In the following years, the Park Service was severely challenged 
by the projected building of the Gettysburg Tower, which it viewed 
as a serious desecration of the battlefield site. 60 In 1971, the 
Service sought its Solicitor's support for a plan to bring suit to enjoin 
the tower's construction.1a The Solicitor responded that "[a]fter 
much study of the problem, we have concluded there is no basis for 
Federal action in the courts to enjoin the proposed construction.''62 
Interestingly, though the Solicitor was unwilling to recommend 
court action, he did not specifically say that the Park Service was 
constitutionally barred from acting. At some point in the early 
1970s, constitutional reservations within the Department of the In-
terior apparently dissipated for, despite its Solicitor's advice, the 
Department thereafter asked the Department of Justice to consider 
bringing a common-law nuisance action to enjoin construction of the 
Gettysburg tower.63 No such action was ever initiated, however, for 
reasons that have never been revealed; instead the Park Service 
later agreed to a compromise under which the tower would be built 
at a somewhat greater distance from the battlefield site. 64 
In 1976, following rather strong judicial criticism in the Sierra 
Club's Redwoods National Park case, 55 the Park Service sufficiently 
overcame its constitutional reservations to ask Congress, relying 
upon the property clause of the Constitution, to give it explicit au-
thority to regulate private activity beyond the boundaries of the Red-
woods National Park. 56 But the bill was never submitted to Congress 
49. Id. 
50. See note 8 supra. 
51. The request is noted in Memorandum from Associate Solicitor, Parks and 
Recreation, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Nathanial P. Reed, Assistant Secre-
tary, Subject, Gettysburg Observation Tower, File 44552.2817, April 30, 1971, at 1. 
52. Id. 
53. Letter from Mitchell Melich, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to The 
Attorney General, June 23, 1971. 
54. Pennsylvania v. Morton, Civil No. 2188-73, Affidavit of Nathanial P. Reed, 
at 13-16 (D.D.C. 1973). 
55. See note 5 supra. 
56. The undated draft of the Interior Department's bill, which exists only in type-
script copy, reads as follows: 
That the Congress hereby finds and declares that significant examples of the 
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because the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), which re-
views all proposed Department legislation, made the following de-
termination: 
During the interagency review of this legislation, a substantive 
problem was identified which is of concern to us. By attempting to 
extend the degree to which the Federal Government can regulate 
the use of private property without creating a compensable taking, 
the bill would provide for a precedential and major expansion of the 
property clause of the U.S. Constitution which we believe should 
not be undertaken, 
In light of the above . . . we plan no further action on the draft 
biU.57 
The 0MB letter is puzzling, to say the least. In contrast to the 
traditional view, which was that the property clause did not grant 
authority to regulate lands outside park boundaries, 0MB presented 
a different reason for believin_g that the proposed Redwoods legis-
lation would be unconstitutional: It suggested that exercise of this 
primeval coastal redwood in that portion of Redwood National Park in Redwood 
Creek basin, Humboldt County, California, which, pursuant to the Act of 
October 2, 1968 (82 Stat. 931 ), were acquired by the United States for purposes 
of public inspiration, enjoyment, and scientific study, will be irreparably lost 
unless reasonable timber harvest regulations and other practices, including rea-
sonable restrictions on harvesting of timber, on watersheds tributary to streams 
within the Redwood Creek portion of the park, and on watersheds tributary to 
streams entering Redwood Creek above Redwci'od National Park, are imple-
mented and enforced; "that, in order fully to implement the purposes of the Act 
of October 2, 1968, the full authority of the Congress under Article IV, Section 
3, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States must be, and by this Act 
hereby is, exercised to protect the Federal property within that portion of Red-
wood National Park in the Redwood Creek basin; and, that, § 3(e) of the 
Redwood National Park Act is amended by adding the following provision: 
The Secretary of the Interior is further authorized to identify and establish 
zones outside the boundary of Redwood National Park but within watersheds 
tributary to streams within that portion of the park in the Redwood Creek basin, 
and on watersheds tributary to streams entering Redwood Creek above Redwood 
National Park, encompassing areas where the Secretary h_as determined that 
timber harvest and other practices, if not subjected to reasonable regulations, 
constitute a threat to federally-owned resources within the park. The Secretary 
shall promulgate and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations, including 
reasonable restrictions on harvesting of timber, within such zones as are nec-
essary to provide continuing protection to the lands and other resources within 
the park. Provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall be considered 
as authority to acquire lands or interests in lands within such zones through the 
adoption of such rules and regulations; and, provided further, that any regula-
tion adopted by the Secretary that is deemed by a court of competent jurisdiction 
to require the taking of a property interest compensable under Article 5 of the 
Constitution of the United States shall be of no effect. Failure to comply with 
rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary pursuant to this authority shall 
be punished as a misdemeanor as provided by 16 U.S.C. § 3. The Secretary is 
further directed to request that the Department of Justice initiate a suit for 
injunctive relief for any violation or anticipated violation of regulations adopted 
hereunder. For state regulation, see 7 ELR 10040 (March 1977). • 
57. Letter from James M. Frey, Assistant Director for Legislative Reference, Of-
fice of Management and Budget (0MB), to Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary of the 
Interior, April 7, 1976. OMB's authority is predicated on 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), 
Exec. Order No. 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 141 (1970), and 0MB Circqlar A-19 (1970). 
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regulatory authority might violate the fifth amendment, which pro-
hibits the taking of private property without just compensation. In 
light of the far-reaching regulation that has been sustained by the 
Supreme Court as consistent with that amendment, Gs OMB's 
implication that the proposed Redwoods bill might fail as an 
uncompensated taking is at best dubious.Go Nonetheless, the Park 
Service at present seems uncertain about its authority under the 
property clause, reluctant to rely upon the expansion of the com-
merce clause witnessed by the last four decades, and uneasy about 
whether regulation of a sort long recognized as well within the police 
power might be viewed as a violation of the taking clause. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 
The preceding section suggested some serious flaws in the 
reasoning of Park Service legal advisers, who have concluded that 
the federal government may not constitutionally regulate private 
holdings beyond park boundaries. This section addresses the four 
constitutional questions raised by proposals for Park Service regu-
lation of private land. First, under what provisions of the Consti-
tution may the federal government be said to have authority to regu-
late private landowners? Second, how far-reaching is that 
authority-does it, for example, allow exercise of the general zoning 
power? Third, in so far as federal authority is limited, to what ex-
tent is it limited by the rights of private property owners and to what 
extent by principles of allocation of legislative authority between the 
states and the United States? And, finally, is there any consti-
tutional basis for distinguishing between regulation of private inhold-
ings within the parks and regulation of private lands beyond park 
boundaries? These questions will be answered by considering the 
relevant sources of constitutional authority. 
A. The Property Clause 
It is easy enough to demonstrate that fears of an absolute consti-
tutional bar to federal regulation of private lands are misplaced. 
58. See, e.g., Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); Goldblatt 
v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See generally Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 
81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). 
59. Perhaps 0MB was affected by the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Curtin 
v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911), holding that regulation of grazing on private land 
within Yosemite National Park was a taking. To the extent that the Curtin decision 
retains any vitality, it should be read to emphasize the severe diminution of value 
that was present in that case. 222 U.S. at 86. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
hon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); note 58 supra. 
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Fifty years ago, in United States v. Alford,60 Justice Holmes relied 
o,n the property clause to uphold the prosecution, under a federal 
statute, of an individual who had started a fire on private land ad-
jacent to a national forest. Holmes flatly rejected the argument that 
a statute regulating conduct engaged in upon private land was 
unconstitutional: "The statute is constitutional. Congress may pro-
hibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the 
publicly owned forests."61 Obviously, as Justice Holmes indicated, 
forest fires do not stop at the boundary lines of publicly owned 
forests. While Congress plainly may protect its forests from fire, just 
as plainly, it cannot be required to insure their protection by 
extending federal ownership, for unless the public domain is to run 
from sea to sea there must inevitably be private land just at the edge 
of the public boundary line. All this Holmes encapsulated in his 
observation that "[t]he danger depends upon the nearness of the 
fire not upon the ownership of the land where it is built."62 
Holmes relied upon an earlier case that had set the tone for a 
generous interpretation of the property clause. In Camfield v. 
United States, 63 the United States had granted odd-numbered 
sections of land to a private proprietor and retained for itself the 
even-numbered sections. By skillfully building fences just on his 
own sections near the property boundary lines, the proprietor suc-
ceeded in enclosing the entire tract. A federal statute prohibited 
the enclosure of federal lands, and the United States sued to compel 
removal of the fences. The defense asserted that if the statute were 
interpreted to prohibit building fences on private property, it must 
be declared unconstitutional. 
The Camfield Court recognized that a decision for the govern-
ment might be read as expanding the property clause to give the 
United States general :police power within the states. But it con-
sidered the defendant's conduct to be nothing less than a nuisance 
under the general principles of the common law, and found intoler-
60. 274 U.S. 264 (1927). 
61. 274 U.S. at 267. Federal regulation of private land external to federal en-
claves has also been sustained under the war power, the treaty power, and the com-
merce power. See McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (authorizing 
the Secretary of War to suppress houses of prostitution within such distance of any 
military camp as he deemed necessary) (see also 18 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970)); Bailey 
v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1942) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior 
to control hunting on private land adjacent to Back Bay Migratory Waterfowl 
Refuge in Virginia). 
62. 274 U.S. at 267. 
63. 167 U.S. S18 (1897). 
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able the prospect of the federal government having something less 
than the rights of an ordinary proprietor to abate a nuisance. Equally 
intolerable would be the incapacity of the federal government to 
vindicate that right by using its own laws. The Court said: 
While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited 
power to legislate against nuisances within a State which it would 
have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory 
as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection 
of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what 
is ordinarily known as the "police power," so long as such power is 
directed solely to its own protection. A different rule would place the 
public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state 
legislation. 04 
The Alford and Camfield cases establish unambiguously that the 
property clause permits federal regulation of private land; indeed, 
in 1976 the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed Camfield, stating 
that "the power granted by the property clause is broad enough to 
reach beyond territorial limits."05 To the extent that the conduct 
in question can broadly be characterized as a common-law type of 
wrong-such as trespass or nuisance-or can be said to imperil the 
public lands, or to impede protection of those lands, it is now beyond 
controversy that federal regulation is appropriate under the property 
power, whether or not jurisdiction over the regulated land has been 
ceded by the state. Moreover, it is clear that Congress need not 
depend upon state law for substantive rules prohibiting such 
conduct.06 
Certainly most of the activity on private land that the Park Service 
needs to regulate would fit comfortably within the holdings of the 
Alford and Camfield cases. 67 Even further scope is given the 
property clause in the Court's recent decision in Kleppe v. New 
Mexico. 68 While that case dealt with regulation of wild animals on 
64. 167 U.S. at 525-26. 
65. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2291 (1976). Other cases are cited 
in Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 20 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). 
66. See text at notes 63, 65 supra; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 
(1947). 
67. See examples in text at notes 7-14 supra. For instance, the Solicitor of the 
Interior Department sent the Department of Justice a memorandum attached to a 
letter, note 53 supra, urging that a common-law nuisance action could be won in 
the Gettysburg Tower controversy. The Department also has researched a nuisance 
suit on the Redwoods National Park situation. Letter from Michele B. Metrinko, 
Associate Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior, to John G. Sobetzer, March 
11, 1976. 
68. 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976). 
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publicly owned land, the Court held that the property clause was not 
limited to regulation required to "protect the public land from 
damage."00 Even where no damage is anticipated, the property 
clause enables Congress to enact a statute, the stated purpose of 
which is "to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological 
balance on the public lands. "70 
The ultimate reach of the property power as to private lands, 
however, was left open by Kleppe, as it had been by Camfield. In 
Kleppe the Court indicated the potential limit of the property clause 
by expressly reserving judgment on whether federal regulation of 
wild horses on private land would be proper simply because they 
had "at any time set foot upon federal land. "71 But this is only to 
suggest the obvious, that "the Property Clause does not authorize 
an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State."72 
The difficult questions that remain may be illustrated by reference 
to the situation at Fire Island. 78 If Congress had gone beyond the 
sword-of-Damocles law now in effect and authorized the Secretary 
to impose routine zoning directly on private owners "by means of 
acreage, frontage, and setback requirements,"74 would such regu-
lation be within the constitutional scope of the property power? No 
satisfactory answer to this question can be drawn simply by analysis 
of decided cases. Plainly, such regulation would go further than that 
sustained by the Court in cases like Alford and Camfield, for it 
neither presents the obvious peril of the forest fire, nor necessarily 
embraces the nuisance-like conduct the Court found in Camfield. 
Nonetheless, it would doubtless be possible for the Park Service 
to demonstrate that even such routine zoning was appropriate to 
protect the uses that Congress sought to promote in establishing the 
park. If Congress itself were to make that determination of 
needfulness, it is highly unlikely that the Court would interpose its 
own judgment as to what sort of regulation was appropriate for the 
protection and maintenance of a national park.75 
69. 96 S. Ct. at 2290. 
70. 96 S. Ct. at 2287. See also New Mexico State Game Commn. v. Udall, 410 
F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969); United States v. 
Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970). 
71. 96 S. Ct. at 2295. 
72. 96 S. Ct. at 2292. The Court, however, studiously ignored New Mexico's 
effort to base a claim on the tenth amendment. See Appellee's Motion to Dismiss 
or Affirm at 25. 
73. See text at notes 19-22 supra; note 19 supra. 
74. 16 U.S.C. § 459e-2(b) (1970). 
75. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2290-91 (1976). 
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Reading congressional power narrowly, so that Congress must buy 
troublesome lands rather than regulating them, is not a satisfactory 
solution.· Certainly this interpretation is not required as a fifth 
amendment matter, for the sort of zoning in question is no more a 
taking of property when imposed by the Congress than it is when 
imposed by a local government. Moreover, as Justice Holmes noted 
in the Alford case, acquisition is not a practicable solution to these 
problems, for no matter how much the federal government buys, 
there will always be problems of conflicting use just at the border 
of the federal enclave. One can move the situs of the problem by 
acquisition, but the problem itself will remain. 
To read the property clause very broadly, however, also presents 
a problem-wide-ranging displacement of traditional state land 
regulation. There is no doubt that federal zoning of inholdings and 
peripheral lands would invade an area long reserved to state and 
local regulation. As a practical matter, this concern is mitigated by 
the fact that the foreseeable needs of the Park Service will not 
likely rise to the level of "general control over public policy in a 
State." Indeed, to the extent that general zoning power of the Fire 
Island type is limited to private lands within park boundaries, 70 the 
expansive possibilities of the property clause are self-constraining. 77 
At the broadest level of concern, the question is one of the general 
relation between the federal government and the states. Every 
expansion of the property clause increases the power of the federal 
government at the expense of the states' authority, and by the tra-
ditional jurisprudence of federalism that is cause for unease. But 
one may ask whether the property clause and the problems of the 
Park Service provide an appropriate setting in which to seek resto-
76. The policy proposal set forth below is so limited. See text at note 122 infra. 
77. Another self-limiting rationale for the use of the property clause to regulate 
peripheral private uses could be drawn from an analogy to the Court's evolution of 
a federal common law of nuisance in cases involving interstate pollution. See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230 (1907). In those cases the Court found that a state, having a sovereign 
interest in the protection of its natural resources, must be viewed as entitled to pro-
tection against threats "by the acts of persons beyond its control." 406 U.S. at 104. 
It can hardly be suggested that the United States has less interest in the protection 
of federal enclaves against such injuries by private landowners "beyond its control" 
than does one state against a city in another state or a state against a private industry 
in another state. The constitutional means by which the federal government can 
protect that interest is an interpretation of the property clause sufficiently broad to 
ensure "that the forests on its mountains . . . should not be further destroyed" by 
private action beyond the borders of its own landholdings. See Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,237 (1907). 
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ration of a relationship between the states and the federal govern-
ment that has long been disavowed in the face of other exercises 
of national authority. 
The courts have decided many cases more sharply intrusive upon 
traditional state power than anything one might anticipate in the area 
of Park Service regulation. Congress has displaced fundamental 
principles of state water law with the federal reclamation program. 78 
A municipal licensee of the Federal Power Commission has been 
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain in contravention 
of state law.79 States have been barred from applying their conser-
vation laws to a federally licensed dam. 8° Federal criminal laws 
have become pervasive. 81 The federal government has displaced 
state literacy requirements for determining voter qualifications. 82 
Local governments have been preempted from imposing curfews at 
airports in their own cities83 and from applying their own safety 
standards for nuclear power plants. 84 Of special interest is the 
whole panoply of national air, water, and noise control laws that have 
created effective federal land use regulation far more pervasive than 
any regulatory authority to which the Park Service will conceivably 
aspire.85 
Indeed, in assessing the scope of the property clause as it affects 
our federal system of government, it is necessary to consider the 
authority the United States has exerted under the commerce power. 
It is not only anomalous to apply sharply divergent theories of 
federal-state relations in interpreting the two constitutional pro-
visions, but it must also be remembered that the commerce clause 
itself is a potential source of federal authority for the regulation of 
private activi·.:y that intrudes upon management of the national parks. 
78. See, e.g., City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrig. 
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
79. Washington v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953); cf. Tacoma v. Tax-
payers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958). 
80. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946). 
81. See, e.g., Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Hoke 
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
See Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 
15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271 (1973). 
82. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
83. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973 ). 
84. Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), affg. 447 
F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971). 
85. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4901 (1970). 
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Although the national parks have been established under the 
property clause, 86 there is no reason to conclude that the federal 
government is barred from protecting the uses of the parks, which 
assuredly involve commerce among the states, under the Constitution's 
commerce clause. 87 
No provision of the Constitution has been read to give more ex-
tensive authority to Congress than the commerce clause. With a 
single distinctive exception, 88 the Supreme Court has not struck 
down a congressional exercise of power under that clause for 
four decades. The Court noted explicitly that the exception, in-
volving federal regulation of state employees, is not to be taken as 
signalling a departure from the Court's long-standing recognition that 
broad congressional regulation of private enterprise under the com-
merce clause is constitutional. 80 
86. The constitutional basis for the establishment of National Parks is actually 
rather hazy. To the extent that parks were carved out of the original public domain, 
they have benefited from the long established view that congressional power over 
the public lands is plenary, and will not be examined by the courts. See Light v. 
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 
16, 29-30 (1940); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954); Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). Where the United States must acquire 
land for the parks, it can rely upon United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 
U.S. 725 (1950), which sustained the federal reclamation program as an exercise 
of the power to spend for the general welfare. The closest case factually is United 
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681, 683 (1896), which upheld the 
condemnation of land for the Gettysburg battlefield memorial. For a very broad 
modem view of the federal condemnation power, see United States ex rel. TV A v. 
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946). The Supreme Court has never passed on 
condemnation of land for a "natural" national park. 
The laws establishing individual national parks, 16 U.S.C. §·§ 21-460 (1970), as 
amended, (Supp. V 1975), and the organic act creating the National Park Service, 
16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975) do not invoke any constitutional 
power of the Congress. However, 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1970), which sets out a decla-
ration of findings and purpose for the national park system, is reminiscent of the 
sentiments expressed in United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 681, 
68'.3 (1896). 
81. See generally Soper, supra note 65, at 22-27. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
96 S. Ct. 2285 (1966), the United States argued that the Wild Free-Roaming Horses 
and Burros Act, which was intended "to achieve and maintain a thriving natural eco-
logical balance on the public lands" was sustainable under the commerce clause. 
However, the Court found it unnecessary to reach this question because it sustained 
the Act under the property clause. 96 S. Ct. at 2289. 
88. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). 
89. In Usery, the majority made clear that it adhered to a very expansive inter• 
pretation of the commerce clause, and rejected only legislation in which "Congress 
seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers." 96 S. Ct. 
at 2469. Nothing in the case suggests that any member of the Court stands ready 
to question federal regulation of private activity. 
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Were Congress to regulate land use within or beyond park 
boundaries based on its commerce power, its action would, upon the 
following rationale, fall comfortably within the range of regulation 
sustained by the decided cases. Travel to and use of the parks 
clearly constitutes substantial interstate commerce. 0° Furthermore, 
it is rational to find that certain activity carried on within or near 
park boundaries causes an impairment of the quality of the experi-
ence for which interstate travel was undertaken. 01 The use of 
constitutional power to protect the quality of commerce, as well as 
its magnitude, is well established.92 Moreover, Congress may 
protect the ultimate "consumer activity" that occurs after the inter-
state commerce itself has come to an end. 93 
The fact that the activity is itself quite local in nature, 94 or is not 
itself a part of commercial dealings, 95 or is even-when viewed 
alone-trivialu6 in relation to commerce among the states, does not 
invalidate the federal power. For the question is not whether the 
activity itself is an element of interstate commerce, but whether com-
merce is "pinched" by the activity07 or by a class of activities of which 
an individual instance may itself be a trifling part whose contribution 
has not been proven. 98 It is sufficient if the regulated activity 
utilizes goods that have been transported in commerce, even though 
the activity itself does not, in any way, serve the interstate travellers 
who use the parks.00 Nor is congressional authority invalid simply 
90. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
91. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (Redwoods National Park); Pennsyl-
vania v. Morton, Civil No. 2188-73 (D.D.C. 1973) (affidavit of Nathaniel P. Reed 
at 3, 6) (Gettysburg National Military Park). On the limited evidence required 
to support the finding, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Perez 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
92. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 381 (1946). See also Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Just as Congress, with plenary power over the District 
of Columbia, may legislate to sustain the quality of life there, so, it would seem, 
may Congress, with full authority over the parks and the interstate travel to them, 
legislate broadly to protect the quality of the park experien~e. Cf. Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R.R., 
413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1969). 
93. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948). 
94. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
95. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
96. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
97. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Assn., 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). 
98. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
99. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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because, in fulfilling a legitimate federal purpose, it occupies an area 
that has traditionally been left to state regulation.10° Finally, even 
when a congressional decision seems strained or doubtful, or a par-
ticular application seems unwisely included within the congressional 
scheme of regulation, the role of the courts in assessing the judgment 
of Congress is extraordinarily limited; the judiciary will intervene 
only where the legislative decision is regarded as irrational.101 
It is hardly conceivable that any Supreme Court that has sat in 
the last four decades would strike down an explicit congressional 
effort to protect national parks by imposing conventional restraints on 
the use of land by private owners near park boundaries. Justice 
Stewart's lonely dissent in the recent Perez case, in which he com-
plained that "it is not enough to say that loan sharking has interstate 
characteristics . . . for interstate business suffers from almost all 
criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets,"102 indi-
cates just how little attention the Court will pay to a claim that 
regulation of a particular private activity is traditionally reserved for 
state regulation. 
V. A PROPOSED FEDERAL POLICY 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
The preceding pages ought to make clear the ample power of 
Congress to give the Park Service broad regulatory authority over 
private lands within and near park boundaries. At the same time, 
it is apparent that intrusion upon traditional local land use regulation. 
presents practical and political concerns that must be taken into 
account during the formulation of a policy for the Park Service. 
The long-standing reluctance of Congress to give significant regulatory 
authority to the Park Service is a revealing measure of that concern. 
The problem, then, is to devise a regulatory policy Congress might 
enact that is both responsive to the needs of the national parks and 
yet not unwisely incursive upon the traditions of local land use 
control. 
Before turning specifically to proposals for new legislation, 
however, two preliminary questions should briefly be considered. 
The first is whether new legislation is actually needed to implement 
100. See text at notes 78-84 supra. 
101. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 
583, 594 (1939); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
102. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971), 
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an appropriate federal program for the regulation of private lands; 
the second is how the federal government ought to define its 
responsibilities as the trustee of national park lands. 
1. The Need for Legislation 
It might be argued that congressional passivity in the face of 
serious threats to the parks constitutes an abdication of a funda-
mental legislative responsibility to preserve park and seashore lands 
that are held in trust by the federal government on behalf of all 
present and future citizens. Some support for this argument may 
be found in the nineteenth century case of Illinois Central Railroad 
v. Illinois,103 where the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois 
legislature's extensive grant to a private company of submerged 
lands along the Chicago waterfront.104 The Court declared that the 
legislature could not relinquish management and control of 
"property in which the public has an interest,"105 which in this case 
was free navigation and commerce over Lake Michigan. Although 
the case lends support to the doctrine of public trust, it does not 
provide a conclusive precedent for regarding Congress as consti-
tutionally bound to legislate to protect the parks. There is a good 
deal of difference between invalidating a dubious state land grant and 
forcing the Congress to enact protective regulation; indeed, the 
judiciary has already demonstrated its reluctance to impose consti-
tutional duties on the Congress with respect to its management of 
the public lands.106 
Alternatively, it might be argued that the public trust argument, 
whatever its merits, is academic because the Park Service has already 
been granted authority to protect the parks from private uses. Yet 
the authority that Congress intends the Service to have is, at best, 
uncertain. The conventional view is that Congress has manifested 
an intent not to regulate private lands, and there is abundant evi-
dence to support that proposition.107 At the same time, the broad 
protective mandate given in the National Parks Organic Act108 indi-
cates that Congress does not intend to leave the parks wholly at the 
103. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
104. A discussion of this case and its implications is included in Sax, The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. 
L. REv. 471, 489-91 (1970). 
105. 146 U.S. at 453. 
106. See authorities cited note ·86 supra. 
107. See text at notes 19-32 supra. 
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975). 
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mercy of private landowners.100 Nor is there anything in the statu-
tory law to suggest that resort to litigation, which produced victories 
in the Alford110 and Camfield111 cases, was meant to be disavowed. 
Thus, the congressional intent, as best it can be discerned, seems 
to be that acquisition is the preferred solution for conflicts between 
the Park Service and private landowners, but that the parks should 
not be worse off than a private landowner would be when faced with 
traditional problems such as trespass and nuisance. Specifically, the 
Service seems free to litigate to abate such problems if other 
solutions fail. The Redwoods Park law112 and the sword-of-
Damocles laws, 113 for all their restrictive language, are consistent 
with this interpretation. Indeed, it has already been noted that the 
Park Service believed it could have initiated a lawsuit to prevent 
construction of the Gettysburg Tower. 
Whatever the current status of congressional authorization, legis-
lation is certainly desirable, both to clarify the Service's authority to 
litigate and to establish its power to promulgate regulations 
governing private conduct of the sort that regularly harms the parks. 
Litigation can provide only an interim remedy for a problem that 
clearly needs legislative attention. 
2. The Responsibilities of a Trustee of the Public Lands 
In order to enact legislation, Congress must decide the scope of 
responsibility it wishes to impose upon the Secretary of the Interior 
as trustee ·of the national park lands.114 Precedents are not 
abundant in this area of the law, 116 but a recent Indian trust case 
provides a striking parallel to the national parks problem. While 
Indian law is distinctive, based as it is upon a sense of profound 
obligation to those native Americans whose lives and culture the 
109. While the Organic Act was enacted at a time when federal powers were 
thought to be very limited, the reach of an Act may expand along with expanding 
notions of congressional authority. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 
96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 n. 2 (1976). 
110. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927), discussed in text at notes 60-
62 supra. 
111. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), discussed in text at notes 
63-65 supra. 
112. See note 5 supra. 
113. See note 19 supra. 
114. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917). 
115. See generally E. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 112-13 
(1951); Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Applica-
tion in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAMETTE L.J, 
135, 136. 
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federal government utterly overwhelmed, the case of Pyramid Lake 
Paiute Tribe v. Morton116 nonetheless provides an example that 
Congress might profitably follow. 
The Indians' traditional livelihood as fishermen was dependent 
upon the water in Pyramid Lake, a desert water body within the 
Reservation that was fed almost exclusively by inflow from the 
Carson River. Upstream on the Carson were many farmers who 
used the river's water for irrigation under contracts made with the 
Secretary of the Interior as part of the federal reclamation program. 
Over the years, as more and more water was taken for irrigation, 
the level of Pyramid Lake dropped severely, threatening the Indian 
uses. 
In a suit brought against the Secretary, the Indians claimed that 
he had violated his trust obligation to assure water to the Reser-
vation. The plaintiffs conceded that the irrigators had property 
rights under their water supply contract with the Secretary, but 
claimed that he was giving the farmers more water than they needed, 
and more than they were legally entitled to get under either their 
contract or the applicable principles of western water law. The 
Secretary sought to compromise the case by reducing irrigation uses 
somewhat, but the Court held that the Secretary had a legal duty 
to the Indians that he could not blunt with a politically expedient 
effort to placate the contending users. 
The decision was striking in a number of respects, including its dis-
cussion of the Secretary's duty, which is of particular interest for our 
purposes. First, the Court held that the Secretary was duty-bound 
to act for the benefit of the Reservation against the private users. 117 
Second, it held that the Secretary must take advantage of available 
legal doctrine, which, under the general theory of water law, gives 
no right to waste water, even if specific amounts are included in a 
water supply contract. Third, the Court compelled the Secretary to 
pursue this argument not only against his judgment, but in a situation 
where the legal rights in question are very rarely exercised, for the 
rules against waste are among the least-enforced strictures in water 
law. 118 Finally, the Court determined for itself that the irrigators' 
uses were wasteful and that the Secretary had taken no steps to 
reduce irrigation uses to nonwasteful levels; in making these 
116. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). 
117. For the limits of Secretarial discretion, see note 35 supra. 
118. C. MEYERS & D. TARLOCK, WATER REsOURCE MANAGEMENT 108 (1971); 
J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 271-80 (1968). 
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determinations the Court enforced the principle much more rigor-
ously than is usual under state law.119 
The decision in the Pyramid Lake case is fully in accord with the 
tradition established in the Supreme Court's early public domain 
cases, such as Alford and Camfield.120 An explication of this tra-
dition begins with the proposition that the federal government 
should not hesitate to regulate private property owners for the pro-
tection of the public domain. The specifics of that protection ought 
to be contained in federal rules designed for the reasonable 
protection of the public lands. In fairness, those federal rules ought 
to draw upon established principles of American law. Adminis-
trative officials should uphold this trust with the full rigor that these 
principles permit, and their duty is enforceable by those who use the 
lands should there be a slackening of vigorous implementation of 
the protective mandate by federal officials.121 
B. Characteristics of the Proposed Federal Policy 
A workable federal policy must include rules for the regulation 
of private land both within and without park boundaries; it must also 
include a rationale for determining how those boundaries ought to 
be defined. Finally, such a policy should contain guidelines for 
determining when the United States ought to acquire, rather than 
regulate, private lands. 
The plan to be proposed here would allow the federal government 
to exercise the police power over private lands within park bounda-
ries to the full extent necessary to protect and maintain park lands 
and uses included in the laws establishing the park.122 Beyond park 
119. The usual cases allow appalling amounts of water to be wasted. See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940); Corpus Christi 
v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955). Even in the rare cases where 
waste is enjoined, only the most blatant departures from good husbandry have usually 
been prevented. See, e.g., Doherty v. Pratt, 34 Nev. 343, 124 P. 574 (1912). A 
recent California case may foretell a much-needed change in judicial attitudes on 
waste, but it is certainly not yet the standard state approach. See Environmental 
Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 8 ERC 1535 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. 
Dist., Div. 1, 1975). 
120. See text at notes 60-65 supra. 
121. See note 35 supra. The Congress should make clear that the protective 
mandate is not unfettered discretion, but is instead law to be applied. See Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971). 
122. For the authority to delegate rule-making to administrative officials, see 
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1910). For an unconventional and un-
persuasive view of possible limits on that authority, see Williams, The National Park 
Service's Master Plan: An Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power?, 11 
N.E.L. REV. 7 (1975). 
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boundaries, the federal government ought to regulate private lands 
only to restrain conduct that broadly can be characterized as 
nuisance-like activity. In order to understand this distinction, it is 
necessary first to say something about the significance cf park 
boundaries. 
1. The Problem of Park Boundary Lines 
Because the early national parks were carved out of a larger 
public domain, in which virtually all the land was owned by the 
United States, 123 park boundaries originally represented a decision 
to withdraw certain areas from the geµeral rules of settlement and 
mining that governed federal lands.124 Later, as parks were 
established in areas where substantial private holdings existed, the 
boundary lines identified those areas that were to be acquired by 
the United States for inclusion in a park.125 
As more park units were established in which significant private 
landholdings seemed likely to remain, 126 there arose a need to de-
velop a managerial policy for private inholdings and to rationalize 
that policy with one for private holdings outside park boundaries. 
Unfortunately, this need has never been satisfied, and the result is 
administrative chaos. The managerial and legal rules that apply to 
inholdings are different from those that govern peripheral lands, and 
the rules applicable to private inholders differ among the various 
parks. As noted earlier, the states have ceded exclusive legislative 
authority to the United States over private inholdings in some parks; 
there the federal government recognizes its right to exercise directly 
123. There were some early exceptions, such as the Rocky Mountain National 
Park, where there were "many thousands of acres in the park owned by private per-
sons." Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 229 (1925). See 16 U.S.C. § 194 (1970). 
124. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-302 (1970) (Homestead Act); 43 U.S.C. §§ 
321-39 (1970) (Desert Land Act); 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970) (General Mining 
Law). 
125. E.g., Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountain National Parks, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 403 (1970); Everglades National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410 (1970); Isle Royale Na-
tional Park, 16 U.S.C. § 408 (1970). It was also a policy to eliminate private hold-
ings in established parks. See 16 U.S.C. § 164 (1970). 
126. At some parks, like Acadia and Cape Hatteras, it was thought desirable to 
retain examples of traditional communities. F. DARLING & N. EICHHORN, MAN AND 
NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 18-19 (1967). See also C. CAMPBELL, supra note 
19, at 148-49 (Great Smoky Mountains National Park). See 16 U.S.C. § 459a-
1 (1970): "That the legal residents of villages •.. shall have the right to earn 
a livelihood by fishing within the boundaries • . . subject to such rules and regula-
tions as the • . . Secretary may deem necessary . . .• " At other parks, established 
residents were permitted to remain on compassionate grounds, or because highly de-
veloped settlements already existed, see note 19 supra. 
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the general police power.127 In other parks, sword-of-Damocles 
type laws are in effect, and the Park Service indirectly asserts the 
general police power.128 Elsewhere, there is only sporadic regu-
lation over private lands within park boundaries.12° For private 
lands outside park boundaries, there is generally no regulation, 
though the Park Service may exert indirect influence either by ne-
gotiation with local officials, by threatening to institute nuisance liti-
gation, or, if statutory authority exists, by threatening to condemn 
the land. Yet boundary lines have sometimes been drawn according 
to no discernible principle (except the obvious expedient of response 
to contending political forces), and thus some lands outside park 
boundaries seem at least as needful of federal regulation as many 
private inholdings.130 
Obviously, if it were possible to begin anew, free of political 
pressures, the establishment of rational park boundary lines would 
be the logical first step. In such an ideal situation, park bounda-
ries would be established according to principles of intelligent eco-
logical management. They would respect watershed lines, viable 
wildlife habitats, natural landscape divisions such as ridge lines and 
valleys, and those land contours that describe the ordinary limits of 
phenomena such as erosion, stream siltation, and flooding. These 
boundaries would represent an intelligible managerial principle-that 
is, they would delimit areas within which comprehensive, integrated 
federal management would be routinely required for the safeguarding 
of park values. 
Lamentably, no such ideal situation exists or is likely to develop, 
although the deplorable experience with the Redwoods National 
Park should suggest to Congress the true cost to the nation of manip-
ulation of park boundary decisions based on expediency. The 
practical problem, then, is to compose a coherent managerial 
program, given the park boundaries as they presently exist. 
The difficulties of the Park Service would be minimized if it 
were allowed to regulate private lands both within and without the 
parks to the fullest extent of federal constitutional authority. But 
there are other important considerations, which suggest that Park 
Service authority should not extend to its constitutional limits. The 
prospect of federal agencies as land-use czars would be most 
127. See notes 41, 42 supra. 
128. See note 19 supra. 
129. See text at notes 16-18 supra. 
130. See note 77 supra. 
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unpopular politically, however clear their constitutional authority 
may be. Moreover, outside the parks there are established 
communities with legitimate interests of their own; it would be 
unwise summarily to displace those interests in favor of the Park 
Service. Further, however irrationally drawn some park boundaries 
may be, the Park Service has greater responsibilities within the parks 
than it has beyond park boundary lines. Finally, Congress cannot 
give the Park Service full police powers outside its boundaries without 
deciding where that power should end, for the problems of trouble-
some private land uses may arise hundreds of miles from a park, 
as demonstrated by the recent Kaiparowits controversy over a pro-
posed power plant in Utah.131 
2. A Proposal for the Limits of Regulatory Authority 
Congress can achieve an appropriate balancing of the competing 
interests by giving the Park Service two different mandates for the 
exercise of regulatory authority, one for private inholdings and the 
other for private land beyond park boundaries. Regarding private 
inholdings, it is suggested that the Park Service be given authority 
to exercise the general police power to the full extent necessary to 
maintain the parks for the purposes for which Congress established 
them. Because it is sharply limited in physical extent, such a 
mandate should not even arguably fall afoul of the decided cases on 
the property and commerce powers; these decisions have shown that 
the judiciary becomes uneasy only at the prospect of "an exercise 
of a general control over public policy in a State. "132 
Such a policy for regulating inholdings would be desirable because 
it would permit the Park Service to exercise similar powers in those 
parks in which exclusive jurisdiction has been ceded and those in 
which it has not. Still, the significance of a cession would not be 
lost, for federal authority would only be exercised in nonceded 
parks to the extent that a need is found for broad federal protective 
regulation under the property and commerce clauses. In parks over 
which state jurisdiction has been ceded, the federal government 
would exercise the general police power for all purposes. In either 
case, this approach would permit needed direct federal regulation 
of inholdings at places like Fire Island and would free the Park 
131. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1975, at 24, col. 1. 
132. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285, 2292 (1976), quoting United States 
v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940). 
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Service from reliance on the demonstrably inadequate sword-of-
Damocles approach. 
As for land beyond park boundaries, no general police power regu-
lation is likely to be necessary. In regulating these lands, the Park 
Service should be limited to curbing the kinds of activities that gave 
rise to the Camfield and Alford cases; this sort of conduct may be 
described very broadly as nuisance-like. The term "nuisance" is 
used here descriptively, rather than technically, and two quali-
fications must be noted to avert misunderstanding. First, Congress 
should allow the Park Service by regulation to define nuisance-like 
activity for itself, rather than having slavishly to follow existing state 
law.133 And, second, some accommodation must be made for the 
peculiar circumstances in which government as a landowner finds 
itself.134 
For example, while aesthetic nuisance is still recognized only 
sporadically in American law, protection against visual intrusion is 
central to the mission of the Park Service. Thus Congress ought 
to grant explicit authority to control, and to prohibit, structures like 
the Gettysburg Tower and the high rise hotel that has been built 
on the outskirts of Great Smoky Mountains National Park but is 
strikingly visible from many places within the Park. Similarly, au-
thority should be given to control the development, on external 
lands, of massive amusement parks that would bring major land 
clearings, substantial structures and hordes of patrons within sight 
and sound of park visitors. At the same time, it should not be neces-
sary to prevent all commercial activity or to restrain very tightly resi-
dential growth and highway building outside the parks in the same 
133. An example of the judiciary defining nuisance-like activity without regard 
for a particular state's limited concepts is provided in Camfield i·. United States, 
167 U.S. 518 (1897), other aspects of which were discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 63 and 64 supra. There, a Colorado landowner who had totally enclosed 
a portion of public land by building fences on his own land claimed that neither the 
common law nor Colorado law prohibited such conduct. The Court admitted this, 
but noted that one state, Massachusetts, had recently legislated against spite fences. 
After drawing analogies to established common-law principles and considering the 
responsibilities of being a good neighbor, the Court found for the government, 
thereby establishing a new sort of federal common law of nuisance. The Park 
Service should be allowed to apply such diverse principles when it fashions regula-
tions. · 
134. Such circumstances were present in Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 
(1911), where the federal government sued to bar trespassing cattle from a national 
forest. The defense was that state law prohibited a trespass action unless a plaintiff 
had fenced his land. The government had not fenced the forest, but the Court im• 
plied that this law should not be applied against the United States because it was 
unreasonable to expect the government to fence a vast tract of open forest. This 
view was affirmed in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 96 S. Ct. 2285 (1976). 
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way that such restraints should be applied to private lands within 
park boundaries. 
3. Regulation and Litigation 
If the sort of legislation proposed here is enacted, the Park Service 
will have authority to issue wide-ranging regulations. Regarding 
land beyond park boundaries, such legislation could broadly, but 
specifically, identify conventional problems such as degradation of 
the park's air and water, siltation of streams, endangerment by 
winds, landslides, mudslides, erosion, land subsidence, noise, 
congestion, visual obstructions and intrusions upon the experience 
of park visitors, unreasonable uses of toxic substances that endanger 
plants and wildlife within the park, and activity in the nature of 
trespass upon park lands. The Park Service would periodically issue 
regulations to meet these problems. 
Is that authority enough, or should Congress also empower the 
Park Service to initiate litigation and seek judicial development of 
a federal common law of nuisance for the parks? There will inevi-
tably arise unanticipated problems that are not reached by the 
language or obvious intent of the regulatory statute. In addition, 
there are always distinctive, individual situations that cannot be 
covered by regulations of general application. It is desirable that 
the Park Service have supplemental authority to go into court with 
a nuisance-type claim when confronted with such unforeseen 
circumstances. 
While one is inherently disadvantaged in specifying problems that 
cannot be anticipated, certainly it is possible to imagine a statute 
similar to that suggested here, enacted in 1930, that failed to say 
anything about radioactive hazards·. And it might be imagined 
that industrial processes of the future will produce unreasonable in-
trusions not easily encompassed within contemporary notions of 
noise, pollution, "toxicity, or trespass. Rather than attempting to 
deal with every possible problem by enacting a statute that gives the 
Secretary open-ended authority to promulgate regulations, Congress 
ought to empower the Park Service to litigate whenever unanticipated 
activities may endanger a park. The courts will thus have the oppor-
tunity to examine thoroughly both the alleged danger to the parks 
and the social need for the activities in question. 
A provision for litigation to develop federal common-law nuisance 
should be advantageous both to the Park Service and to landowners. 
The existence of a potential judicial remedy should help to 
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discourage the Park Service from formulating vague, all-encom-
passing regulations designed to guard against every possible 
contingency. From the landowner's perspective, a nuisance action 
provides a greater opportunity to put forward the substantive merits 
of a particular case, rather than being limited to the narrow argu-
ments that a regulation exceeded the authority granted in the statute 
or that it is arbitrary and capricious.185 
It is desirable that those potentially affected by publicly imposed 
constraints have a significant opportunity to express their concerns. 
If regulations are proposed to govern recurrent problems involving 
substantial numbers of people, it is reasonable to anticipate that 
sufficient numbers of the affected group will forcefully voice their 
objections at the time the regulations are proposed, thereby having 
some influence on the outcome. The more individualistic or vague 
the regulations, the less that opportunity realistically exists. For 
such circumstances, the Park Service should be authorized, and 
encouraged, to institute litigation so that landowners can obtain a full 
hearing. While it will not be possible for legislation to define 
exactly those situations in which litigation rather than regulation is 
appropriate, Congress can certainly give the Park Service guidance 
through a careful development of legislative history 
It would also be wise explicitly to limit the Park Service to a 
judicial federal nuisance remedy for all conduct beyond a specified 
distance from the park. There is little need for control by regu-
lation, even over common nuisance-like activities, as one moves 
away significantly from park boundaries. Moreover, the further one 
moves from the park, the greater is the likelihood of intruding upon 
the extensive land regulation of established cities and towns. A 
mileage limitation would minimize the potential for conflict, 
confusion, and duplicative efforts among the various governments. 
It would be undesirable to require large numbers of people at some 
distance from the parks to study park regulations before they could 
vary the uses of their land. Beyond this, there is much to be said 
for blunting the perception that the Park Service will, if per-
mitted, seek to become an ubiquitous land manager. A sensible limi-
tation might be to require litigation of problems arising on land more 
than two or three miles from the park, or on closer lands outside 
the park boundaries if the land is within a sizeable city (50,000 
135. For the effect of the Administrative Procedure Act on the Park Service, 
see Williams, supra note 122, at 22 n.36. 
December 1976] The National Parks 269 
population or more), which is likely to have its own elaborate land 
use controls. 
4. Choosing Between Acquisition and Regulation 
There remains the question of when the federal government 
ought to buy, rather than merely regulate, land whose uses 
potentially conflict with park purposes. The preceding pages imply 
clearly enough that present congressional and administrative policies. 
go too far in the direction of acquisition, but in formulating a new 
policy care must be taken to avoid excessive reliance on regulation. 
Obviously, the federal government should, and must, buy inter-
ests when attempts to regulate them would be unconstitutional 
takings of property. There is, however, a further consideration. 
The United States is, for purposes of these cases, both the sovereign 
and a neighboring landowner. Limited only by constitutional prohi-
bitions against uncompensated takings, the federal government may 
be in a position to constrain quite unfairly the uses to which its 
private neighbors put their land. It ought, therefore, to adopt a 
policy for fair dealing that goes beyond the bare bones of its consti-
tutional duty to compensate. 
In order to fulfill both its constitutional duties and to conform with 
reasonable standards of fair dealing, the federal government should 
acquire an ownership interest in private land within or near park 
boundaries if one of the following conditions obtains: 
a. The land is needed for occupancy by the Park Service or by 
park visitors. 
b. The land, though not needed for occupancy, requires the 
acquisition of interests in land which, under the established 
law of eminent domain, constitutes a taking of property. 
c. The federal government imposes contraints which, even if not 
a taking under constitutional doctrine, go beyond the sorts of 
regulation that have become familiar under the general police 
power in American law or in the resolution of conflicts be-
tween neighbors. 
Unless the constraint falls within one of these three categories, the 
Park Service should be free to regulate private land in accordance 
with the approach suggested above. Each of these standards will 
now be explained specifically. 
a. Land needed for occupancy. A simple rule of thumb appli-
cable to most situations that are traditionally and literally a taking 
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of property is that they involve the acquisition of physical possession. 
There is no significant ambiguity in this category. 
b. Nonoccupancy interests that constitute a taking. The im-
position of nondevelopment easements entailing severe economic 
loss to the owner, even though the desired uses do not impair the 
use of the federally owned land, would generally be treated as a 
taking. For example, if farming were prohibited in order to pre-
serve the land's wild appearance, or if all structures and roads were 
ordered removed from the land, acquisition with compensation 
would probably be necessary.136 A flat prohibition upon all timber 
harvesting would normally fall within this category, as would a re-
quirement that the land be managed unprofitably in order to provide 
browse for wildlife indigenous to the park.137 In general, the im-
position of affirmative duties, such as the construction and mainten-
ance of fire towers for the benefit of park lands, would also be 
considered nonoccupancy takings. 
c. Constraints that go beyond familiar police power or conflict 
accommodation between neighbors. This third standard for acqui-
sition is designed to impose upon the federal government a 
requirement of fairness more generous than the Constitution 
demands, so that the private neighbors of national parks will not be 
disadvantaged merely because the federal government is their 
neighbor. The principle might be stated this way: It is unreason-
able for a private property owner to demand that he not be dis-
advantaged at all because a national park is his neighbor, but it is 
reasonable for him to demand that he not be disadvantaged by re-
strictions outside the scope of those that have become conventional 
American law for the resolution of conflicts between neighboring 
landowners. 
One can readily conceive of circumstances where regulation with-
out compensation would be at least arguably constitutional, but 
where considerations of fairness ought to prevail and require 
payment. The Park Service should not, out of a desire to maintain 
136. The exact limits of constitutional constraint under the fifth amendment are 
far from clear, and it is not the purpose of this article to review those questions 
in detail. The examples given are simply by way of broad illustration. For a de-
tailed analysis of the constitutional issue, see the articles cited in note 58 supra. 
For a case suggesting that even the restrictions used as illustrations in the text might 
pass constitutional muster, see Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 
761 (1972). 
137. It should be noted that this is, in essence, the situation in which the Su-
preme Court reserved judgment under the property power in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 
96 S. Ct. 2285, 2295 (1976). 
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the ecological purity of the park area, prohibit agricultural 
landowners from using pesticides that are generally accepted on 
agricultural lands elsewhere, unless it is willing to pay for the losses 
that such restraints may entail. Nor should it bar private owners 
from using conventional fire-fighting techniques, even in park areas 
where the Service has decided upon a strategy of letting fires bum 
themselves out. Despite its special concern for maintaining wildlife 
populations in a park, the Park Service should not impose upon its 
neighbors land management strategies for the maintenance of 
wildlife that are more onerous than those applicable to open or 
agricultural lands generally.138 Of course, the Service may freely 
employ all these constraints if it is willing to compensate the 
landowners. 
A case study that illuminates the proper application of this princi-
ple is the bitterly contested battle over automobile regulation at 
Fire Island National Seashore.139 The Seashore Superintendent has 
called the controversy "perplexing . . . emotion laden, sensitive 
_ . a can of worms."140 In brief, the problem arises from the 
fact that Fire Island seashore includes a number of intensively de-
veloped resort communities, as well as a fragile dune ecosystem on 
a small barrier island. Traditional access to the island had been by 
boat, but two automobile bridges were built, one of them in 1964, 
the same year the National Seashore was established. The Park 
Service established a regulation forbidding vehicular traffic across 
the federal lands in the Seashore. Private housing development 
mushroomed in the following decade and residents have applied 
intense pressures, including litigation, in an effort to secure permission 
138. Under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1334 
(Supp. V 1975), private landowners are permitted, but not required, to maintain 
such animals on their lands. 
139. See Neilson v. Gotbolt, Mem., No. 75-C-1283 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1975); 
Biderman v. Morton, 507 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1974), affg. Mem., No. 72-C-1060 
(E.D.N.Y. July 19, 1974). See also Lighthouse Shores Inc. v. Town of Islip, -
N.Y.2d -, 372 N.Y.S.2d 995, - N.E.2d - (1976); Long Island Beach Buggy Assn. 
v. Town of Islip, 58 Misc. 2d 295, 295 N.Y.S.2d 268, affd., 35 App. Div. 2d 739, 316 
N.Y.S.2d 430 (1970); Hodges v. Town of Islip, N.Y.L.J. July 27, 1964 (Sup. Ct. 
Nassau Co.); Faulhaber v. Village of Saltaire, Mem., June 8, 1970, Index No. 
192005 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.); Thornberg v. Town of Islip, Mem., Dec. 11, 1975, 
Index No. 74-9379 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co.). 
A similar controversy over the use of vehicles has arisen at Back Bay National 
Wildlife Refuge, managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. See Coupland v. 
Morton, 526 F.2d 588, 7 ERC 2127, 5 ELR 20507 (4th Cir. 1975); National Audubon 
Socy. v. Kleppe, No. 76-589-N (E.D. Va., filed Sept. 28, 1976); Note 5 ELR 10148 
(1975). 
140. Letter from Richard W. Marks, Superintendent, to Congressman Thomas 
J. Downey, File W46 FIIS, Feb. 25, 1976, at 1, 12. 
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to drive through the National Seashore to reach private property.141 
Several courts have concluded that very strict vehicle use 
constraints imposed by the Park Service142 (as well as by a local 
municipality) are constitutional, within statutory authority and 
reasonably appropriate to protect the Seashore lands.148 But there 
remains the painful and politically sensitive144 question whether the 
rigorous restraints the Park Service imposed are unfair to the resi-
dents subject to them. Without doubt the regulation is onerous: 
"The only permit which [the Park Service has] granted . . . is 
a permit authorizing [a year-round resident] to drive to mainland 
Long Island once each week for medical reasons. Beyond that she 
can travel by automobile only upon the receipt of a specific 
permission which must be obtained by specific application covering 
a particular occasion as occasions arise."145 
How are we to analyze the propriety of imposing such a regulation 
without compensation? Plainly this is a much more restrictive rule 
than that to which homeowners are routinely subjected by local 
governments. And plainly it disappointed expectations the owner 
might have had in 1969 when she acquired her property. At the 
same time, a person who moves to Fire Island cannot expect to 
enjoy all the usual urban amenities, particularly in light of the clear 
mandate of preservation and ·limited development under which the 
Seashore was established in 1964.146 In these respects, the claims 
of the property owner are neither clearly unreasonable nor clearly 
meritorious; the case is a hard one. 
Despite the apparent difficulties, an appropriate solution can be 
discerned through application of traditional legal principles to the 
owner's claims. She does not qualify for an easement of necessity 
under conventional property notions, for while denied the most 
convenient form of access, she has not been denied all access to her 
property; she continues to have the use of boats and footpaths, which 
have been traditional on the island.147 Nor have her expectations 
141. The background of the Fire Island controversy is set out in U.S. DEPT. OF 
THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, GENERAL MANAGEMENT PLAN, FIRE ISLAND 
NATIONAL SEASHORE (Draft, June 1976). See also notes 10, 35, 139 supra. 
142. 36 C.F.R. § 7.20 (1976). 
143. See cases cited note 139 supra. 
144. See note 140 supra. 
145. Neilson v. Gotbolt, Mem., 75-C-1283, at 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1975). 
146. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 459e to 459e-12 (1970). 
147. See 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1T 410, at 428, 439 n.34, 
444 (1975). Cf. 43 U.S.C. § 959 (1970), 43 U.S.C. § 946 (1970) (authority to 
limit rights-of-way over federal lands). 
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developed into rights through compliance with the rules of 
prescription or adverse possession that are routinely recognized 
under state law.148 Moreover, she is no more disadvantaged by the 
Park Service than she might be had her neighbor been a 
private landowner. Assume, for example, that a major recreational 
developer had been the owner of the Fire Island land over which 
vehicle access is sought. If, despite a previous owner's permission 
to drive over that land, the developer had decided to build a summer 
resort free of J:Qotor vehicle traffic ( similar . to that on Mackinac 
Island, Michigan), she would surely have been subject to the same 
sort of inconvenience that the Park Service has now imposed upon her. 
These factors should be decisive against the resident, for while 
she has been disadvantaged by being a neighbor of the Park Service, 
she has not been "disadvantaged by restrictions outside the scope 
of those that have become conventional in American law in 
resolving conflicts between neighboring landowners."140 The Park 
Service should be free to impose such regulations on landholders with-
out compensation. 
A final observation on this subject is that Congress need not legis-
late explicitly on the question of when acquisition is required. 
Congress can make clear in a statute setting out Park Service regu-
latory authority, and in the legislative history, that the regulatory 
power is not meant to include the imposition of restrictions outside 
the scope of those that have been enacted by local governments or 
have become conventional in the resolution of disputes between 
neighboring landowners. Thus, should the Park Service attempt to 
regulate beyond that scope, an affected landowner could properly 
challenge the regulation as beyond the power Congress intended to 
confer. If the landowner prevails, the Park Service would have no 
choice but to seek funds to acquire the interest in question. Or 
Congress could, in any given instance, reject the judicial interpre-
tation of its intent by refusing to allow acquisition and by stating 
explicitly its desire to permit uncompensated regulation in the par-
ticular situation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Before the general suggestions made in the preceding pages can 
be converted into specific statutory language, a number of difficult 
148. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 147, ,r 413, at 493 n.58, 497, ,r 416 at 520 
n.10, 521-23; RESTATEMENT OF PROPER1Y § 479 (1944). 
149. See text following note 137 supra. 
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issues must be resolved. Among them is whether a single statute 
could adequately speak to the variety of managerial issues that 
face the Park Service, which has charge of hundreds of seashores, 
monuments, parks, and historic sites. Another is -the ever perplexing 
question of the degree of specificity with which Congress should 
instruct administrative officials. 
It is not the purpose of this article to provide the answers to all 
these, and many other, questions, which will require the knowledge 
and experience of Park Service personnel. It is hoped that this 
article will commend itself as the beginning of an inquiry into pro-
posals for much needed legislation. The outcome of that inquiry 
cannot be predicted with exactitude here. But certainly enough has 
been said in this article to suggest that the giants can properly be 
roused from their long sleep. 
